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NRO REVIEW COMPLETED

RATIONALE FOR NEW NRO AGREEMENT


1. For CIA's scientific and technical capabilities to survive under the existing agreement dated 13 March 1963 requires a full measure of good will on the part of DOD based on their conviction that CIA's participation in the National Reconnaissance Program is essential in the national interest.

2. Under the present contract, DOD legally can eliminate CIA for all practical purposes from the National Reconnaissance Program.

3. It is therefore recommended that a new agreement, substantially embodying the concepts of the attached draft agreement, be approved.

4. If an agreement along these lines cannot be negotiated, it is preferable for CIA to withdraw voluntarily from reconnaissance activities, rather than subject itself to progressive elimination against its will.

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AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
ON
MANAGEMENT OF THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM

1. As a matter of national policy, it is essential that the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense both have a continuing, positive voice in the establishment, management, and conduct of the National Reconnaissance Program.

2. It is likewise essential that the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency both participate fully in the development and operation of reconnaissance assets.

3. The two groups must collaborate fully to create a single National Reconnaissance Program which shall be managed and conducted in accordance with the policies and guidance jointly agreed to by the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence.

4. To this end, an Executive Committee is hereby established to formulate, guide, and regulate the National Reconnaissance Program. It will consist of the Director of Central Intelligence and the Under Secretary of Defense, and such other members as they determine.

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5. The Executive Committee will establish its own procedures under which, among others:

a. It will receive USIB requirements for new systems and consider development proposals from both DOD and CIA.

b. It will allocate development responsibilities and establish guidelines for mutual support between DOD and CIA.

c. It will approve the consolidated National Reconnaissance Program budget.

d. With the 303 Committee, it will assign operational responsibilities to either DOD or CIA in light of their capabilities and the political consequences.

e. It will be free to use technical advisory groups from PSAC or elsewhere to judge the technical feasibility of these proposals and consult with the Bureau of the Budget, as necessary, to judge their fiscal impact for each new program.

6. The Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence will each name a senior official of their department or agency to supervise all aspects of their participation in the National Reconnaissance Program. The Secretary

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of Defense will designate a Director of Defense Reconnaissance (DDR) who will report directly to him and will command all elements of the DOD reconnaissance activities under the direct authority and control of the Secretary of Defense. The Director of Central Intelligence will likewise designate a Director of Reconnaissance in the CIA who will report directly to him and be responsible for and exercise command over all elements of CIA reconnaissance activities. These officers, pursuant to the decisions of the Executive Committee will be responsible for the management of all aspects of the NRP which fall within their respective departments.

7. To insure the coordination of CIA and DOD reconnaissance activities and to provide a single point of integration for the planning and budgeting for the National Reconnaissance Program, a Director of National Reconnaissance will be appointed jointly by the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence. He will not exercise command control over either the Department of Defense or Central Intelligence Agency line organizational elements. USIB requirements for operational missions will go to the Director of National Reconnaissance, who in turn will serve them on either the Department of Defense or the Central Intelligence Agency in line with the assignment of development and operational responsibilities made by the Executive Committee. The DNR will sit with the

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USIB for those matters affecting the NRP. The Director of National Reconnaissance will also advise the Special Group (303) in its consideration of proposed overhead reconnaissance operations. The Terms of Reference of the DNR are set forth in Schedule A, attached.

8. Funds for the CIA and DOD portions of the NRP will be made available at the beginning of each fiscal year in lump sum form in accordance with the program allocation and combined budget approved by the EXCOM. ~~Funding procedures are set forth in Schedule B, attached.~~

9. This agreement is effective upon signature and supersedes the DOD-CIA Agreement dated 13 March 1964.

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TERMS OF REFERENCE OF DNR

He will:

a. Coordinate and present the combined National Reconnaissance budget to the Bureau of the Budget and, as necessary, to Congress.

b. Describe and present the NRP to the PFIAB.

c. Present to the Executive Committee the progress of the components' reconnaissance programs in DOD and CIA.

d. Maintain a uniform system of security procedures and control in accordance with security procedures established for the NRP by the DCI.

He will be kept fully and completely informed of all reconnaissance activities in both CIA and DOD and will have immediate and total access to all phases of their programs. ✓
He will be responsible for coordinating the film processing activities of both CIA and DOD so as to make best use of their separate facilities and to insure prompt transmission of all film to NPIC and magnetic tape to NSA. He will coordinate utilization of national space launching facilities

at Vandenberg Air Force Base, Cape Kennedy, and elsewhere so that satellite payloads developed by both DOD and CIA can be launched and, as necessary tracked and recovered as efficiently as possible. He will establish and adjust reconnaissance launch schedules at those facilities in response to national requirements and in conjunction with the physical limitations of the facilities.

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